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REVIEW ARTICLE 
Democratization, post-industrialization, and East Asian welfare capitalism:  
The politics of welfare state reform in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 
 
Abstract 
This review article provides an overview of the scholarship on the establishment and reform 
of East Asian welfare capitalism. The developmental welfare state theory and the related 
productivist welfare regime approach have dominated the study of welfare states in the re-
gion. This essay, however, shows that a growing body of research challenges the dominant 
literature. We identify two key driving factors of welfare reform in East Asia, namely democ-
ratization and post-industrialization; and discuss how these two drivers have undermined the 
political and functional underpinnings of the post-war equilibrium of the East Asian wel-
fare/production regime. Its unfolding transformation and the new politics of social policy in 
the region challenge the notion of “East Asian exceptionalism”, and we suggest that recent 
welfare reforms call for a better integration of the region into the literature of advanced politi-
cal economies to allow for cross-fertilization between Eastern and Western literatures.   
 
Keywords: Democratization, Post-Industrialization, Welfare Capitalism, Developmentalism, 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan. 
 
East Asian welfare states have experienced comprehensive reforms in the last two decades. 
Following the regional “pioneer” of Japan, the neighbouring South Korea and Taiwan have 
introduced unemployment protection schemes, and have universalized health-care provision 
and old-age security. Also observed has been increased state intervention in child and long-
term care in the region, including Japan. Welfare state expansion in the three countries, with 
the rise of social citizenship, challenges perceived wisdom in the literature. According to de-
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velopmental welfare state theory, and the related productivist welfare regime approach, social 
policy (driven by technocrats) is strictly subordinated to the primary policy goal of economic 
development, and therefore social welfare provision is confined to “productive” parts of the 
population (in particular, regular workers in key industries). However, recent policy expan-
sion benefited presumably “non-productive” parts of the population as well (such as the un-
employed, women, children, and the elderly), whilst the deregulation of employment protec-
tion undermined the developmentalist “welfare-through-work” system.  
This article reviews the literature on the establishment and reform of East Asian welfare 
capitalism. In so doing, we focus on the research examining the political and socio-economic 
drivers of the unfolding transformation of East Asian welfare capitalism; with a focus on Ja-
pan, Korea, and Taiwan. We show how democratization (that is, the end of authoritarianism 
in Korea and Taiwan, and the end of one-party dominance in Japan) and post-industrialization 
(that is, both labour market and family changes, such as the rise in female employment and 
the decline of traditional families) have undermined the post-war equilibrium of the East 
Asian welfare/production regime. Democratization has allowed the rise of political parties and 
societal actors in social policy-making, challenging the dominance of economic bureaucrats. 
We also identify limitations of the reform literature, notably paying insufficient attention to 
the role of political parties; and suggest that political parties, facing fierce electoral competi-
tion, are now claiming the “driving seat” in social policy. Political agency operates in a con-
text of post-industrialization, which has driven new social risks calling for social policy inter-
vention (notably, child and long-term care expansion). We, thus, highlight that a powerful in-
teraction between democratization and post-industrialization, which calls for further explora-
tion. 
The observed welfare state reforms and the new politics of social policy in the region 
call into question the notion of “East Asian exceptionalism” and the associated theories of the 
developmental and Confucian welfare state. Instead of the adhering to “regional” approaches 
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in the study of social policy, we suggest that recent East Asian welfare reforms in the wake of 
democratization and post-industrialization call for a better integration of the region into the 
literature of advanced political economies, where established tools of welfare state analysis 
(especially, those looking at partisanship and party competition) help us better understand the 
transformation of East Asian welfare capitalism. This also allows for cross-fertilization be-
tween “Western” and “East Asian” literatures for more robust theory development in compar-
ative political economy and welfare state research.  
 
The Developmental Welfare State in East Asia 
Rapid economic development in post-war Japan and newly industrialized economies in East 
Asia (especially, Korea and Taiwan) between the 1960s and late 1990s attracted great interest 
in the region. Building on developmental state theory and its highlighting of the steering role 
of the state (C. A. Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990), social policy analysis in the region has been 
dominated by the developmental welfare state perspective and the related productivist welfare 
regime approach (Holliday, 2000; Kwon, 1997; Deyo, 1992). According to this body of litera-
ture, social policy is subordinated to the key policy objectives of economic growth and indus-
trialization; and policy-makers forcefully pursued the state-led “modernization” of their econ-
omies, which was essentially understood as catching up with advanced economies in the 
West.  
At the early stages of industrialization, social policy was considered largely incompati-
ble with economic development. Developmental strategies at first focused on light, labour-
intensive manufacturing for the world market, which put great pressure on labour costs leav-
ing little room for social innovations. However, the economic success of this developmental 
strategy created labour shortages and corresponding pressure on wages, which in turn made 
light-industry-based development increasingly unfeasible. In this context, a change of strategy 
towards higher value-added manufacturing was undertaken. This type of industrialization re-
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quired human capital investments for greater productivity and labour force stability, which 
provided the socio-economic underpinnings for increased expenditure on education and train-
ing but also on health and enterprise welfare. Thus, the objective of up-skilling workforces 
made economic development and social policy compatible (Deyo, 1992).  
The developmental state concentrated its welfare efforts on the presumably productive 
parts of the population, especially skilled workers in large companies but also civil servants 
and the military. And indeed, the coverage of early social insurance schemes (health care and 
old-age security) was rather selective with the majority of the population being excluded 
(Kwon, 1997). By contrast, social care was not considered a good “investment,” and also so-
cial security for weaker members of society was typically viewed as a burden on the economy 
(Holliday & Wilding, 2003a, p. 166). Overall, we observed the reluctance of the developmen-
tal state to engage in the provision of social welfare; and East Asian welfare states are gener-
ally considered “low spenders”, where the state prioritizes the investment into industrial rather 
than social development (White & Goodman, 1998, p. 13; Kwon, 1997, p. 471).  
Whilst public social policy provision is poorly developed, some scholars point out that 
so-called “surrogate social policies” enjoy great prominence in the region, such as mandatory 
enterprise welfare and subsidies for farmers and small- and medium-sized companies. The 
former, especially in Japan and Korea, was pushed by policy-makers in order to pre-empt 
popular demands for universal social welfare. With respect to the latter, it is acknowledged 
that these subsidies cannot easily be defined as social policy. However, this state support, as a 
measure of trade protectionism, was granted in order to shield the agricultural sector and 
small employers from international competition and thereby to protect employment. Critical-
ly, in the developmental welfare state, employment is crucial for access to benefits, and the 
East Asian welfare model presents a system of “welfare through work”, where economic 
growth and corresponding high levels of employment were thought to substitute for generous 
social welfare provision in the first place (Estévez-Abe, 2008; Kim, 2010; Miura, 2012). In 
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addition to trade protectionism, high levels of employment were achieved through strict em-
ployment regulation and the (de-facto) lifetime employment practice (E.-H. Jung & Cheon, 
2006, pp. 458-460; Woo-Cumings, 2007, p. 18). The regulation of employment in the region 
created “profound core-periphery distinctions” (Goodman & Peng, 1996, p. 197) with well-
protected insiders (who have access to relatively generous benefits), whereas labour market 
outsiders enjoyed little social protection.  
The developmentalist logic is reinforced by Confucian ethos, which attaches great im-
portance to the family. Welfare, particularly social care for children and the elderly but also 
social protection, is believed to be best provided by families, within which Confucianism en-
courages a rigid traditional division of gender roles – the man being perceived as the “natural” 
head of the family and its breadwinner, whereas the woman’s role is primarily seen as the 
provider of care. From this perspective, state intervention into family affairs is considered un-
desirable, putting an immense burden on women, who are expected to provide unpaid care 
work within their families across generations. Hence, a strong male breadwinner ideology can 
be ascribed great weight in East Asian societies (Won & Pascall, 2004; see also Lewis, 1992 
on the male breadwinner model). However, the role of families goes beyond their function in 
care provision. Traditionally, based upon the Confucian ideals of filial piety and family obli-
gations, East Asian families were furthermore characterized by considerable intergenerational 
monetary transfers (especially, from sons to parents in the absence of old-age security) (Jones, 
1993). Thus, social welfare provision by families (as promoted by Confucianism) allowed the 
state to prioritize economic development, whilst largely ignoring social policy. 
 
The Politics of the Developmental Welfare State 
The East Asian developmental welfare state was built by conservative elites in the absence of 
competitive politics. Admittedly, after World War II, Japan was democratized, but the con-
servative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) monopolized political power for most of the post-
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war period. It was not before 1993 that the party found itself on the opposition benches. Thus, 
despite the country’s democratization, “soft authoritarianism” was widely ascribed to the Jap-
anese political system. In Korea, the 1961 military coup created a single-party regime, where 
elections were no more than an instrument of the dictatorship to formally legitimize its rule. 
Lastly, Taiwan, also with a single-party regime, did not even attempt to appear democratic. 
Instead, the external threat from mainland China was used by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) 
to justify the authoritarian system (Holliday, 2000, p. 715; C. Johnson, 1987, pp. 143-44; 
White & Goodman, 1998, p. 15). 
An important common feature of the scholarship on the building of East Asian welfare 
states is the emphasis put on the role of bureaucrats. Whilst politicians set broad policy goals, 
technocrats (in a supposedly depoliticized manner) engaged in policy planning, the develop-
ment of new policy, and their implementation. Highly centralized bureaucracies are consid-
ered key to the coordination of different policies for economic growth, and the developmental 
(welfare) state is typically associated with bureaucratic dominance in policy-making 
(Goodman & Peng, 1996, p. 196; Holliday, 2000, p. 715). Conservative elites, in politics and 
bureaucracies, shared the key objective of industrialization and economic development – both 
were driven by the “imperative” of modernization (Kwon, 1997, pp. 497-80). It was also 
thought that economic growth and the associated prosperity would legitimize authoritarian 
rule, which made the developmental state a strategy of “stability through growth” (Holliday, 
2000, p. 715). In this context, the developmental welfare state contributed to regime stability 
by granting favourable treatment to those who were considered particularly important to the 
government. In addition to core workers (for productivist reasons), civil servants and the mili-
tary were among the first to benefit from public social welfare provision in order to ensure the 
loyalty of these groups (Goodman & Peng, 1996; White & Goodman, 1998). By contrast, so-
cial citizenship and redistribution received very little political support, and we find a “clear 
hostility to the European welfare state” (Holliday & Wilding, 2003a, p. 167) among conserva-
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tive elites, who believed that European-style social policy provision would undermine the tra-
ditional Confucian family.  
Although the developmental state approach highlights the leading role of the state in 
economic development, it also recognizes a critical alliance between the state and business, 
the so-called “developmental alliance”, behind the formation of specific sets of economic and 
social policy (Hundt, 2009; Wade, 1990). However, even though the developmental state 
largely promoted business interests (and granted employers incomparably greater policy in-
fluence than other societal actors), the state had the “upper hand” and kept business “at a dis-
tance” (Holliday & Wilding, 2003b, p. 35) allowing the government to pursue its interests 
when in conflict with employers.  
Unlike business, organized labour was effectively excluded from the political decision-
making process, which provided ruling elites with a remarkable degree of political autonomy 
from societal forces. Disciplined (and low-cost) labour was considered a precondition for fast 
and export-oriented industrialization, and this was thought to require the exclusion of trade 
unions from the political process (Buchanan & Nicholls, 2003; Pempel & Tsunekawa, 1979). 
Critically, the predominance of enterprise unionism in the region undermined institutionally 
the forming of strong working-class interests and solidarity, and therefore contributed to re-
gime stability and the insignificance of organized labour and social democracy (Deyo, 1987; 
C. Johnson, 1987). Holliday highlights that “benevolent authoritarianism was for many years 
accepted rather than challenged by workers” (Holliday, 2000, p. 719). Importantly, we cannot 
account for the welfare state’s “post-war development in terms of right-left political move-
ments” (Goodman & Peng, 1996, p. 208; see also White & Goodman, 1998; Yang, 2013) and, 
accordingly, the literature argues for the insignificance of political parties in East Asian wel-
fare politics. This stands in sharp contrast to the historical experience of West European wel-
fare states, where (left) party political agency is ascribed great importance (Esping-Andersen, 
1985; Huber & Stephens, 2001). 
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The developmentalist approach and the argument of “East Asian exceptionalism” (cf. 
Peng & Wong, 2010) have been challenged by recent welfare state expansions in the face of 
democratization and post-industrialization. Welfare state provision has been expanded to 
“non-productive” parts of the population, which could be interpreted as the emergence of a 
notion of social citizenship in the Far East (Y.-M. Kim, 2008; H.-K. Lee, 1999). In the next 
sections, we discuss the scholarship on the impact of democratization and post-
industrialization on welfare state development in the region. 
 
Following the Japanese Pioneer? The Rise of Social Protection in Democratic Korea and 
Taiwan 
Entering the late 1980s, the political landscape in Korea and Taiwan experienced massive 
changes with the transition to democracy. In 1987, martial law was lifted in Taiwan, and the 
first presidential election was held in Korea (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). With the cessation 
of repression of opposition parties and extension of elections to all levels of government, 
competitive politics became the norm in Korea and Taiwan. In tandem with democratization, 
the two countries underwent a process of “welfare state deepening”. Most notably, the frag-
mented social insurance system, a key characteristic of East Asian welfare capitalism, turned 
into a universalistic one (Peng & Wong, 2010). Pension and health-care schemes were univer-
salized as compulsory coverage was extended to less productive workers (i.e. employees of 
small- and medium-sized firms, farmers, and the self-employed). The two countries further-
more introduced unemployment protection schemes in the 1990s, though benefit levels and 
coverage were somewhat modest, in addition to strict eligibility criteria (Peng & Wong, 2008; 
Ringen, Kwon, Yi, Kim, & Lee, 2011). Intriguingly, these developments in democratizing 
Korea and Taiwan resemble the Japanese post-war experience. During American occupation 
(1945-52), Japan saw the introduction of unemployment insurance, though with rather limited 
coverage. Whilst benefit generosity stayed modest during LDP rule (from 1955), benefit cov-
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erage was extended to all regular workers and some active labour market policy measures 
were introduced in the mid-1970s. Despite these developments, unemployment insurance re-
mained geared towards the protection of core workforces (Seeleib-Kaiser, 1995). By contrast, 
during the era of high-speed growth until the mid-1970s, the LDP universalized health insur-
ance and old-age protection. The latter though provided only modest benefits, and this trans-
lated into high saving rates. Also, surrogate social policies played an important role through-
out LDP hegemony (Kasza, 2006). 
Despite substantial welfare state expansion in Korea and Taiwan, the developmental 
welfare state approach “defended” its corner, arguing that the rise of social policy did not 
pose a fundamental challenge to developmentalism in the region. Whilst Kwon (2009) 
acknowledges that the developmental welfare state was transformed from a “selective” variant 
to an “inclusive” one, Holliday (2005) assertively contends that welfare reforms in Korea and 
Taiwan were still largely informed by “productivist concerns” regardless of the emergence of 
competitive politics (see also Ahn & Lee, 2012; Aspalter, 2006). This literature has been criti-
cized for downplaying the scope of the welfare state change that the region experienced; and, 
in terms of the politics of social policy, it has been argued that the development of East Asian 
social welfare provision in the democratic era was underpinned by a qualitatively different 
political logic; that is, electoral competition.  
A number of scholars contend that if the ruling conservatives advanced (modest) social 
policy for economic growth and legitimization prior to democratization, they did so for elec-
toral calculation in the democratic era (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Peng & Wong, 2010; 
Wong, 2004). During the immediate years following the democratic transition, conservative 
governments instigated welfare reforms whenever necessary to secure electoral success. In 
Korea, coinciding with elections, conservatives gradually extended health insurance coverage, 
and a national pension scheme was introduced immediately before the first presidential elec-
tion. In Taiwan, the conservative KMT swiftly implemented a national healthcare program in 
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1995, facing legislative and presidential elections. Moreover, the healthcare program took the 
form of the universal insurance that had been promoted by the opposition party, the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP). Both countries also saw the introduction of selective unem-
ployment protection under conservative governments in the second half of the 1990s. The 
main rationale of the Korean Kim Young-Sam government was to pre-empt opposition from 
organized labour to proposed labour market deregulation (S. C. Lee, 2012), whereas the Tai-
wanese case underscored the opportunistic political behaviour of the ruling KMT in the wake 
of elections; unemployment protection was first proposed by the DPP (Zhu, 2005, p. 94). We 
find that democratization brought greater pluralism into social policy-making, as electoral 
competition incentivized politicians to be more sensitive to broader societal demands. Popular 
calls for redistribution through the welfare state were channelled through social movements 
and policy experts, creating pro-welfare advocacy coalitions and constraining the dominance 
of the developmental alliance in social-policy making (Y.-M. Kim, 2008; Peng & Wong, 
2010; Ringen, et al., 2011).  
This “democratization” literature made critical contributions to improving our under-
standing of social policy developments in Korea and Taiwan. It showed the “responsiveness” 
of conservative political elites to electoral demands, in their efforts to overcome association 
with the authoritarian regimes. In fact, conservatives, who had displayed a firm anti-welfare 
stance in the past, made opportunistic “concessions” to the electorate and civil society to stay 
in power – with reasonable success. Insofar, it can indeed be argued that the political right 
remained in the “driving seat” of welfare state development in the early period of democratic 
transition.  
Importantly, the opportunistic electoral strategies of the conservatives in Korea and 
Taiwan appear to follow the earlier example of Japan, where the LDP routinely took an op-
portunistic approach to welfare in its post-war rule. While the LDP dominated the political 
arena, Kasza (2006) argues that social policy was critical for party to establish its hegemonic 
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status in electoral competition with the Japanese Socialist Party in particular, and to win sup-
port for its developmental program of economic growth first. Calder (1989) describes social 
welfare as a popular measure of compensation to “dissidents” in situations of political crisis. 
Thus, whilst Japan’s previous electoral system of multi-member districts and single non-
transferable vote is widely viewed as having prevented the emergence of a generous “Europe-
an-style” welfare state (Estévez-Abe, 2008), social policy was nonetheless an important tool 
of the ruling elite of LDP, big business, and bureaucrats (Kasza, 2006). In the light of the Jap-
anese experience, one might therefore want to argue that Korea and Taiwan in democratic 
transition caught up with their already democratized neighbour; and that the developmental 
alliance remained unchallenged in social welfare policy. 
 
The Rise of Political Parties in East Asian Welfare Politics 
Despite highlighting the importance of electoral competition (though in somewhat vague 
terms), the democratization literature failed to recognize the rise of party-political agency, 
which continued to be downplayed (as in the developmental welfare state approach). We also 
contend that empirical observations suggest that this literature struggled to fully acknowledge 
the rise of the political left in particular, the subsequent conservative loss of control over the 
welfare state, and the implications of these developments for East Asian welfare politics. Wel-
fare state deepening was advanced by the electoral victories of left political parties. In Korea 
and Taiwan, the political left and long-time opposition parties won presidential elections in 
the aftermath of the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/8, and they were confirmed in gov-
ernment in both countries. We find that left parties, in alliances with organized labour 
(Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017b; Kamimura, 2010; Zhu 2005), promoted the expansion of welfare 
benefits for workers (see Hong, 2014 on the importance of economic crisis). It appears that 
the political left emerged as a champion of the welfare state. In terms of social policy platform, 
it has been argued left parties in East Asia demonstrated some affinity with the social-
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democratic welfare model, as they articulated some enthusiasm for universal coverage of so-
cial protection and tax-funded welfare benefits (Fell, 2004; Y.-M. Kim, 2008; Kuhnle, 2004).  
In Korea, the centre-left Kim Dae-Jung government implemented a series of compre-
hensive welfare reforms improving old-age security and health care provision, in addition to 
expanding the selective unemployment protection scheme to all full-time workers and some 
atypical workers and improving benefit generosity and duration. Also, the government de-
ployed public work schemes and employment promotion subsidies to reduce the burden of 
unemployment caused by the East Asian financial crisis, as it introduced non-contributory 
public assistance for those who still fell outside the unemployment insurance scheme The 
thrust of these reforms was to improve social protection for non-productive and less-
productive populations, and to strengthen the redistributive capacity of social policy (D. Jung 
& Park, 2011; Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017b).  
In Taiwan, the centre-left DPP government, elected on a social welfare platform 
(Haggard, 2005), endeavoured to strengthen the redistributive capacity of the welfare state by 
enhancing social protection for the unemployed and the elderly. In the wake of the 2001 re-
cession, the DPP government replaced the modest unemployment protection with a more 
comprehensive new scheme: the coverage was expanded to employees of small firms as well 
as part-time workers, in addition to increasing benefit generosity. Like Korea, Taiwan also 
engaged in greater employment promotion and job creation schemes during the tenure of the 
DPP government (Chang, 2011; Chen, 2010). To improve old-age income security for those 
neglected by the KMT, the DPP introduced a basic old-age pension scheme and substantially 
increased the very modest benefits that less productive works (e.g. farmers) received 
(Haggard, 2005, p. 29). 
In the 1990s, we also observed the rise of party-political agency in Japan with the end of 
one-party dominance in the country. For the first time, the LDP failed to form a government 
in 1993; and instead a coalition of the political left formed a majority. Moreover, a major 
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electoral reform in 1994 undermined the LDP’s ability to harvest electoral majorities out of 
special interests (such as farmers and small businesses), and it is expected that changes in 
government become a regular feature in Japan (Rosenbluth & Thies, 2010). The LDP’s failure 
to dominate the legislature signifies the end of Japanese “soft-authoritarianism” and that com-
petitive politics has become the norm in the country, as it has become in Korea and Taiwan. 
In Japan, democratic consolidation challenged the conservative ownership of the welfare state, 
and we find remarkable activism in the domain of family policy in particular, where the polit-
ical left performed a critical agenda-setting function, to which the LDP responded. Critically, 
the political left in Korea and Taiwan also discovered family policy, and we witness devel-
opments that display great similarities with the Japanese trajectory. In consideration of these 
empirical observations, we suggest greater attention should be paid to the role of political left 
in the future scholarship. We now discuss post-industrialization and the decline of the Confu-
cian family as the socio-economic driver of recent family policy expansion in the region, 
which is followed by exploring the interaction between post-industrialization and democratic 
consolidation in the region. 
 
Post-Industrialization and the Decline of the Confucian Family 
As with Western welfare states (Daly & Rake, 2003; Lewis, 1992), the developmental welfare 
state of East Asia was built for the industrial age. As discussed earlier, it was geared in partic-
ular towards male workers in manufacturing industries to promote economic development and 
industrialization in societies that had greatly relied on agriculture, and this male breadwinner 
bias had been reinforced in the expansion of social protection in the early stages of democrati-
zation. By contrast, very little support was provided for those who were deemed “non-
productive” (especially, women). This model of development was feasible in a context of fast 
economic growth (with low levels of unemployment) and stable Confucian families (provid-
ing a basic social safety net and social care). However, these assumptions, which had already 
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been discarded in advanced economies in the West, have also become untenable in East Asia, 
where post-industrialization has increasingly undermined the previous welfare settlement (S. 
S.-y. Lee, 2011; Peng, 2004; Peng & Wong, 2008). After rapid industrialization (with indus-
trial employment peaking in Japan in the early 1970s, and in Korea and Taiwan in 1991 and 
1987, respectively), all three countries experienced steady increases in service sector em-
ployment (see Figure 1). Post-industrialization was accompanied by a significant increase in 
women’s employment. Admittedly, female labour market participation in the region lags 
somewhat behind the development in Western countries, as with the shift towards service sec-
tor employment. Yet, this should not deflect from the rising number of East Asian women 
who have entered the labour market – especially in Japan, where female employment partici-
pation reached levels we can find in France (which has historically been classified as a modi-
fied male breadwinner country; Lewis, 1992 - see Figure 2).  
 
(Insert Figures 1 and 2 here) 
 
The growth of female labour market participation has far-reaching implications for East Asian 
societies, which were built upon Confucian ideas of a gendered division of paid and unpaid 
labour. This, however, as in Western societies, has become ever less feasible with rising fe-
male employment rates. The double burden of paid labour and unpaid care puts enormous 
pressure on women, who experience huge difficulties to reconcile their employment with their 
domestic “duties”. In strong male breadwinner countries in particular, women do not receive 
much public support in work/family reconciliation. The state does not conceive that it has re-
sponsibilities for public child and eldercare provision, leaving this to families and markets. 
Especially in conservative welfare states, great responsibility is ascribed to families, typically 
based on the Catholic principle of subsidiarity (Seeleib-Kaiser, Van Dyk, & Roggenkamp, 
2008). Likewise in East Asian societies, the responsibility for care was left to families, so that 
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one might want to consider Confucianism as the functional equivalent to Catholicism in the 
Western world. Accordingly, family policies supporting work/family reconciliation were most 
poorly developed. Hence, in East Asia, as elsewhere in the developed world (Bonoli, 2005; 
Esping-Andersen, 1999), we have also been witnessing the emergence of the “new social 
risk” of work/family conflicts (related to both the care of children and frail elderly) (Abe, 
2010; Peng, 2004; Tsai, 2011). 
In such a context, Schoppa (2010) argues, with reference to the case of Japan, that 
women (with presumably little “voice” in politics) face a fundamental decision between ca-
reer and family. It is observed that an increasing number of women “exit” from the family, 
and make a decision for career. The situation in Korea and Taiwan, with similar family policy 
trajectories, shows much resemblance. The societal consequences are enormous. Not only do 
we witness a significant decline in marriage rates challenging the traditional Confucian fami-
ly, East Asian societies have furthermore experienced a dramatic decline in fertility rates; es-
pecially in Korea and Taiwan. Fertility rates in the region are now considerably below the av-
erage across the developed world (see Table 1), and much below the replacement fertility rate 
of 2.1.  
 
 (Insert Table 1 here) 
 
The “fertility crisis” and the associated population ageing have important consequences not 
only for social security systems (especially, pensions and health) but also for labour markets. 
However, East Asian families, as well as getting much smaller, are also much more “unsta-
ble”, as expressed in divorce rates. In the 1970s, divorce was virtually unknown in Korea and 
Taiwan but has increased substantially over time. Eventually, both countries experienced di-
vorce rates that exceeded the OECD average. Japan has also witnessed a significant increase 
in divorce rates over the last few decades but these have remained slightly below the OECD 
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average (see Table 2). Despite the somewhat different trajectory in Japan, it can be concluded 
that East Asian societies have lost their exceptional status of remarkable marital and family 
stability, which poses another challenge to the ideal of the Confucian family. In addition, the 
Confucian ideal of multi-generational families (Jones, 1993) has been withering away in 
“modern” East Asia, with only a small minority of families complying with this traditional 
ideal. Instead, the nuclear family has been becoming ever more predominant (see Table 3). 
 
(Insert Tables 2 and 3 here) 
 
Looking at labour market and family indicators, the overall picture appears to be that East 
Asia has “normalized”, and faces similar if not greater challenges than other OECD countries 
in the wake of post-industrialization (for instance, the challenge of very low fertility rates). In 
other words, as elsewhere in the developed world, families in East Asia are “under stress” and 
increasingly struggle to fulfil their assigned functions, which has fuelled calls for more public 
provision for families. One might want to argue that these developments have culminated in a 
functional “imperative” for a larger stake of the state in family affairs. This has considerable 
political-economic implications, as the developmental (welfare) state heavily relies on the 
care provided free of charge by families. The great role of families allowed the state to priori-
tize investments in infrastructure and “national champions” for rapid industrialization and 
“catching-up” with the West, whilst social policy could remain minimalistic, geared towards 
the productive parts of society. This division of labour between families and the state has be-
come ever less feasible in the post-industrial age. It has become difficult to assume women’s 
unpaid provision of household and care work. This not only undermines the developmental 
state but also the male breadwinner model that lies at the heart of the Confucian welfare state.  
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Post-Industrialization, Democratization, and the Rise of Family Policy 
Whilst the argument of a functional “imperative” against the background of increasing female 
employment participation and collapsing Confucian families might be attractive, it is puzzling 
that we find policy developments in Taiwan lagging behind policy innovations in Japan and 
especially Korea (An & Peng, 2016). Since Taiwan has experienced the most dramatic decline 
in fertility (not only across the region but also across the developed world), one might have 
expected, from a purely functionalist point of view, more ambitious policies to support fami-
lies. This suggests the importance of politics in policy reform.  
Distinguishing the period of democratic consolidation from the post-industrial era, Peng 
and Wong (2008) describe the end of the “progressive coalition” (with civil society organiza-
tions as important policy entrepreneurs) and instead emphasize the economic rationale of 
these new social policies, and accordingly present a case for cross-class support in their ex-
pansion (that is, neo-liberal economic reformers and social policy activists joining forces) (see 
also Seeleib-Kaiser & Toivonen, 2011 for the economic rationale in policy discourses); and in 
light of the identified economic rationale, Peng (2012) suggests the “readjustment rather than 
the replacement” of developmental state strategies. Although there might be good economic 
reasons for new social policies (especially because of their human capital dimension), it needs 
to be noted that employers (who should have the greatest interest in social policies supporting 
economic development) expressed the strongest opposition to family policy expansion (S. C. 
Lee, 2012; Seeleib-Kaiser & Toivonen, 2011; Tsai, 2011), making it difficult to observe 
genuine cross-class support. Thus, in family policy, employers in three countries (though 
widely considered coordinate market economies [CMEs]) displayed policy preferences we 
find in liberal market economies rather than CMEs, where businesses in Sweden and Germa-
ny, for instance, supported employment-oriented family policy expansion (Fleckenstein & 
Lee, 2014; Fleckenstein & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). Organized labour did not show much “en-
thusiasm” for family policy expansion either, but prioritized the interests of male workers in 
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accordance with the insider/outsider model. Even in the Korean case (where trade unions pur-
sued the interests of labour market outsiders in unemployment protection), family policy re-
ceived, at best, “lukewarm” support from organized labour. 
In the face of these policy preferences of economic agency, we emphasize the interests 
of political agency in the expansion of family policy. Looking at the political dynamics of 
family policy expansion, we observe that the first wave of expansion to support for (working) 
women with dependent children and the frail elderly in all three countries was driven by the 
political left in power. In the 1990s, with the so-called “Angel Plan”, the Japanese left suc-
cessfully spearheaded the expansion of childcare provision during its five years of govern-
ment tenure (1993-8), in addition to the introduction of a parental leave scheme and long-term 
care insurance (Estévez-Abe, 2008, pp. 237-42; Peng, 2004, pp. 401-2). Following the re-
gional pioneer, Korea – with the longest duration of left incumbency (that is, 10 years) – saw 
the greatest rise of family policies helping with work/family reconciliation (Peng, 2009). In 
Taiwan, the DPP also implemented a number of family policy measures to support mothers 
(Tsai, 2011). However, Taiwan failed to establish a long-term care insurance scheme, but with 
the 10-Year Plan for Long-Term Care from 2007 the country appears to move towards a more 
comprehensive system of elderly care (Fu & Hughes, 2010).  
To distinguish themselves from the conservative parties and to break their “hegemony” 
in welfare politics, left parties in all three countries campaigned with ambitious welfare state 
programs and were identified as pro-welfare parties by the electorate (Estévez-Abe, 2008; 
Fell, 2004; Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017a). In government, the left accelerated social policy ex-
pansion, although it needs to be acknowledged that left parties (as with some of their Europe-
an counterparts in government) struggled to fully implement their social policy programs. 
Nonetheless, social policy expansion in the region under left leadership shows the emerging 
importance of party-political agency and provides some support for the parties matter thesis, 
although one has to concede that the East Asian political left does not entirely comply with 
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the ideal of social-democratic parties in Scandinavia (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Huber & 
Stephens, 2001). However, the same applies to social democracy in Continental Europe, 
where conservative policy legacies have had an enormous impact on “social-democratic” so-
cial policy preferences and electoral strategies (Baldwin, 1990; Seeleib-Kaiser, et al., 2008). 
Family policy expansion though should not be reduced to left parties in government, as Peng 
(in earlier work) argues, who highlights the role of female agency in family policy-making 
(Peng, 2004; see also Peng & Wong, 2008). Thus, early family policy expansion in the region, 
we suggest, seems to resemble the “social democracy cum feminism” argument we know 
from the paradigmatic case of family policy expansion in Sweden (Huber & Stephens, 2001). 
Surprisingly, one might argue, family policy expansion continued when the conserva-
tive parties in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan succeeded the left in government. However, the con-
servatives in the three countries, which had previously most strongly advocated male bread-
winner policy rooted in their Confucian ideology, showed differences in their modernization 
efforts, leading to varying degrees of cross-party support for family policy expansion. At one 
end of the spectrum, we find the Korean Saenuri Party, which moved considerably away from 
its previous position in order to gain an electoral advantage. The policy U-turn of the con-
servatives triggered the left party to promise even more generous and universalist family poli-
cy expansion in order to outbid its conservative competitor (S. C. Lee, 2017). As its Korean 
counterpart, the Japanese LDP underwent a modernization and expansion of its family policy 
platform after losing its dominance in the legislature (Boling, 2015; Estévez-Abe & Kim, 
2014). In comparison to the conservative parties in Korea and Japan, the Taiwanese KMT 
showed only rather limited modernization efforts. However, after 10 years in opposition, the 
KMT also adopted a more pro-active family policy (Tsai, 2011). 
Apparently, the conservative parties in all three countries responded to family policy 
expansion under left leadership with the modernization of their policy “portfolios”. One can, 
thus, observe some convergence on pro-family platforms across the political spectrum, alt-
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hough with varying degrees. We suggest that the unexpected development was driven by par-
ty competition. Having been ousted from power, the conservatives (opportunistically as in the 
past) revised their electoral strategies. Specifically, to broaden their electoral appeal to those 
who turned towards left parties after the democratic transition became imperative. In Korea, it 
was young voters in their thirties in particular who were deemed critical for returning into 
government office (B.-K. Kim, 2008; S. C. Lee, 2017). In the Taiwanese case, it was women 
and middle-class voters that the DPP strove to win with their progressive family policy plat-
form, and apparently the KMT learned its lesson (Fell, 2004). In Japan, the literature high-
lights the importance of the growing number of independent voters, especially in urban areas 
and young voters (Estévez-Abe, 2008; Noble, 2010; Pempel, 2008; Rosenbluth & Thies, 
2010). Our analysis of ISSP data (see Figure 3) highlights the great appeal of family policy 
for young female voters in particular. To woo these critical voters, the political right jumped 
on the pro-family policy bandwagon, from which young, dual-earner families in urban areas 
could benefit the most. Looking at the scope of family policy expansion, the ISSP data is also 
informative. In Korea, where we witnessed the most comprehensive family policy expansion, 
we find the strongest support for childcare policy. Admittedly, the overall support in Japan 
and Taiwan is fairly similar, but it is important to note that strong support for these policies is 
by far the lowest in Taiwan, where family policies experienced the least expansion. Apparent-
ly, family policy is of less electoral importance in Taiwan, as compared to Korea and Japan; 
and unsurprisingly, this is reflected in relatively modest policy expansion and the limited pol-
icy U-turn of the KMT. The presented findings suggest some responsiveness of East Asian 
political parties to electoral demands. For both parties of the left and right, it has become no 
longer feasible to ignore policy preferences in electorates. 
 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
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Against this observation that political parties “discovered” the mobilizing capacity of 
family policies in the post-industrial age and responded (often in a somewhat opportunistic 
manner) to the public’s “appetite” for social welfare, we suggest a powerful interaction be-
tween democratization and post-industrialization, as the latter reshaped policy preferences to 
which political parties, as vote- and office-seekers (cf. Strøm, 1990), responded. Thus, in 
terms of the politics of social policy, party competition, rather than illusive cross-class sup-
port, appears at the core of family policy expansion in the region.  
Putting these developments into a broader comparative context, it is important to 
acknowledge that we have been observing family policy expansion across the OECD. Certain-
ly, there is considerable variation in speed (and progress in some countries has been slow), but 
the overall direction is remarkably similar, as we have been witnessing great challenges to the 
male breadwinner ideology (Lewis, 2009; OECD, 2011). And, as with East Asian parties, po-
litical parties in the West have experienced a decline of partisan difference, with conservative 
parties joining the parties of the left in the promotion of work/family reconciliation policies. 
We find left and right parties championing remarkably similar political discourses in their at-
tempts to mobilize voters and especially female voters, who are most receptive to family poli-
cy expansion (Fleckenstein, 2010; Seeleib-Kaiser, et al., 2008). Thus, research into how party 
competition has shaped family policy reform in East Asia not only has potential to make im-
portant contributions to the East Asian welfare capitalism literature, but also allows cross-
fertilization between the Eastern and Western scholarship in the field of welfare state research.   
 
Conclusions 
With the observed welfare state expansion and the rise of social citizenship in the region, East 
Asian welfare capitalism has been subject to comprehensive transformation; and democratiza-
tion and post-industrialization have undermined both the political and functional underpin-
nings of the previous welfare/production regime. Hence, the developmental welfare state ap-
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proach has experienced a substantial loss of explanatory capacity. Democratization introduced 
competitive politics, which challenged the dominance of bureaucrats in economic and social 
policy-making. It has been shown that the developmental alliance, which was at the heart of 
rapid industrialization and economic growth, collapsed; and that electoral victories of the po-
litical left challenged the conservative “ownership” of the welfare state. In the aftermath of 
democratization, conservative parties, in defence of their “hegemonic” status, engaged in lim-
ited welfare state expansion for rather opportunistic reasons in the face of competitive politics. 
However, electoral victories of the political left in all three countries challenged the conserva-
tive dominance and accelerated social policy expansion. These developments, at least tempo-
rarily, provided some support for partisan difference in the region. 
In sum, in terms of both the substance and the politics of social policy, East Asian po-
litical economies have “normalized”, calling into question the notion of “East Asian excep-
tionalism.” East Asian welfare politics lost its exceptional feature of bureaucratic dominance 
as democratic transition gave rise to the “usual suspects” of Western welfare politics, espe-
cially political parties. The transformation of welfare politic was then translated into East 
Asian social policy losing its exceptional feature of productivism. The social policy expansion 
in post-democratization era went far beyond protecting productivist populations.  
 Whilst the early democratization literature focuses on “politics” (with an emphasis on 
“old” social policies, namely health insurance, old-age security, and unemployment protec-
tion; in addition to downplaying party-political agency), we suggest that the far-reaching im-
plications of post-industrialization and its interaction with democratization deserve greater 
attention for advancing our understanding of transformation of East Asian welfare capitalism. 
The interaction between political dynamics and socio-economic changes is most important for 
the second wave of welfare reforms expanding “new” social policies (especially child and 
eldercare policy), with which the region addressed the emergence of new social risks. This 
second wave of social policy expansion after democratic transition is insufficiently addressed 
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in the existing democratization literature. We have shown that the political left responded first 
to new electoral needs (in particular, young and female voters’ demands for policies support-
ing work/family reconciliation), but conservative parties “caught up” with their competitors, 
and modernized their social policy platforms in an instrumentalist manner. We find both left 
and conservative parties, coping with intensified electoral competition, now claim the “driv-
ing seat” in social policy-making (especially, in the development of “new” social policies in 
the face of the ideal of the Confucian family becoming ever less viable). Without denying the 
persistence of considerable cross-national difference, it is important to acknowledge that East 
Asian social policies have started to show greater similarity to social welfare in Western polit-
ical economies. Certainly, despite recent expansion, East Asian welfare states (as their West-
ern counterparts) struggle in coping with both old and new social risks, but this should not 
deflect from the fact that welfare states have been subject to significant reform to address 
identified social problems. 
Not only the substantive changes in social policy but also the new political dynamics 
pose a great problem to East Asian social policy analysis, where conventional wisdom seems 
exhausted. Here, we suggest the use of established tools of analysis in the “mainstream” polit-
ical economy and welfare state literature (in particular those highlighting partisanship and 
party competition). This not only improves our understanding of East Asian welfare capital-
ism, it also allows us to better integrate the region into the wider comparative literature for 
important cross-fertilization and more robust theory development.  
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Table 1: Fertility Rates in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Japan 2.13 1.75 1.54 1.36 1.39 
Korea 4.53 2.83 1.59 1.47 1.23 
Taiwan 4.00 2.50 1.80 1.68 0.92 
OECD 2.71 2.14 1.86 1.65 1.70 
Source: OECD, Taiwanese Executive Yuan. 
 
Table 2: Divorce Rates in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan  
 
 1971 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Japan 1.0 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.1 
Korea 0.3 0.6 1.1 2.5 2.6 
Taiwan 0.4 0.8* 1.4* 2.4 2.8 
OECD 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.3 
* Taiwanese Data is from 1981 and 1991, respectively. 
Source: OECD, Taiwanese Executive Yuan. 
 
Table 3: Family Types in Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Japan Nuclear Family 71.4 75.4 77.6 81.2 84.1 
 Extended Family 17.3 17.8 16.6 13.6 10.2 
Korea Nuclear Family 71.5 72.9 76.0 82.0 82.2 
 Extended Family 18.8 11.0 10.2 8.0 6.2 
Taiwan Nuclear Family - - 76.2* 76.2 76.0 
 Extended Family - - 18.4* 17.0 15.3 
* Taiwanese data is from 1995 
Source: Japanese Statistical Bureau, Statistics Korea, Taiwanese Executive Yuan.  
